if so, then it does help to get what SZ is all about.
Heidegger's claim earlier in Division 1 of Being and Time...is that the human being finds itself in a world that is richly meaningful and with which it is fascinated. In other words, the world is homely (heimlich), cosy even. In anxiety, all of this changes. Suddenly, I am overtaken by the mood of anxiety that renders the world meaningless. It appears to me as an inauthentic spectacle, a kind of tranquilised and pointless bustle of activity. In anxiety, the everyday world slips away and my home becomes uncanny (unheimlich) and strange to me. From being a player in the game of life that I loved, I become an observer of a game that I no longer see the point in playing.
What is first glimpsed in anxiety is the authentic self. As the world slips away, we obtrude. I like to think about this in maritime terms. Inauthentic life in the world is completely bound up with things and other people in a kind of "groundless floating" – the phrase is Heidegger's. Everyday life in the world is like being immersed in the sea and drowned by the world's suffocating banality. Anxiety is the experience of the tide going out, the seawater draining away, revealing a self stranded on the strand, as it were. Anxiety is that basic mood when the self first distinguishes itself from the world and becomes self-aware.
Anxiety does not need darkness, despair and night sweats. It can arise in the most innocuous of situations: sitting in the subway distractedly reading a book and overhearing conversations, one is suddenly seized by the feeling of meaninglessness, by the radical distinction between yourself and the world in which you find yourself. With this experience of anxiety, Heidegger says, Dasein is individualised and becomes self-aware.
суббота, 12 сентября 2009 г.
пятница, 24 июля 2009 г.
The Telos of Dasein
It seems to me that, should one divide the extant “torso” of SZ between the contents corresponding, respectively, to the two nouns of which its title consists, the “waist” would be found precisely between sections 64 and 65.
Yet before (or alongside with) going through this time-part, we need a clear idea of how exactly H. construes temporality per se, prior to its functioning as an "origin" of world and--via it--ordinary time.
This is what I am currently stuck with.
Here, BTW, the analogy of the swimmer properly belongs.
============
“To be” one’s possibility (in this case, a swimmer) is not the same as “to be (doing)” anything actually (in this case, swimming). Just as the meaning of "can" is different in, respectively, (1) "I can (at any time) swim (or not swim)" and (2) "I can be a swimmer (because I am one already)".
Can you please explain the meaning of sentence 2 and then contrast it to 1?
===========
A key phrase is on H. 191:
Das Dasein hat sich in seinem Sein je schon zusammengestellt mit einer Möglichkeit seiner selbst.
This is precisely the Möglichkeit of which (2) speaks. It differs from the possibility for me to swim in that it is constitues the being of my self.
The possibility fo me to swim does not constitute my self; it is my possibility, but not (a possibility for me to be) me.
I (=my self) have to exist already, in order for there to be a possibility for me to do this or that (in particular, to swim).
Also, the possibility for me to swim can be inferred from an actuality, namely, that of my present conditions and past experience.
My being a swimmer, on the contrary, cannot, in principle, be inferred from any actual condition or experience of mine; it is a purely projected (i.e., a priori) possibility.
Finally, and most importantly: the possibility for me to swim at a certain given moment, once actualized, ceases to exist; whereas the Möglichkeit of which H. speaks, remains--despite (or, rather, in virtue of) its having been actualized--a possibility.
Yet before (or alongside with) going through this time-part, we need a clear idea of how exactly H. construes temporality per se, prior to its functioning as an "origin" of world and--via it--ordinary time.
This is what I am currently stuck with.
Here, BTW, the analogy of the swimmer properly belongs.
============
“To be” one’s possibility (in this case, a swimmer) is not the same as “to be (doing)” anything actually (in this case, swimming). Just as the meaning of "can" is different in, respectively, (1) "I can (at any time) swim (or not swim)" and (2) "I can be a swimmer (because I am one already)".
Can you please explain the meaning of sentence 2 and then contrast it to 1?
===========
A key phrase is on H. 191:
Das Dasein hat sich in seinem Sein je schon zusammengestellt mit einer Möglichkeit seiner selbst.
This is precisely the Möglichkeit of which (2) speaks. It differs from the possibility for me to swim in that it is constitues the being of my self.
The possibility fo me to swim does not constitute my self; it is my possibility, but not (a possibility for me to be) me.
I (=my self) have to exist already, in order for there to be a possibility for me to do this or that (in particular, to swim).
Also, the possibility for me to swim can be inferred from an actuality, namely, that of my present conditions and past experience.
My being a swimmer, on the contrary, cannot, in principle, be inferred from any actual condition or experience of mine; it is a purely projected (i.e., a priori) possibility.
Finally, and most importantly: the possibility for me to swim at a certain given moment, once actualized, ceases to exist; whereas the Möglichkeit of which H. speaks, remains--despite (or, rather, in virtue of) its having been actualized--a possibility.
среда, 22 июля 2009 г.
SZ, section 65, H. 329
From the very outset, your post clearly said:
"Blattner differs in that he (A) points out the thesis which he believes to be pivotal to Heidegger whole magnum opus, and (B) puts this thesis into question, actually claiming that Heidegger fails to demonstrate it."
So there seem to be a few questions that need to be addressed to get us back on track:
1) Is this something that requires demonstration?
2) If so, does H. ever attempt to explicitly demonstrate this? (Does Bl. mean by "failure to demonstrate" that H. never attempts to show this or that his demonstration fails?)
3) If H. has attempted to demonstrate this point, where does he do so? (What sections of SZ, etc.?)
4) If he does not, can the rest of his work serve as an implicit demonstration?
5) Does the demonstration (if it exists) really fail?
Also:
6) Is this thesis that important to H's project?
How does sequential time arrive out of non-sequential time?
===========
As a brief and preliminary response--here is what I believe to be a key passage (H. 329):
Das Charakteristische der dem vulgären Verständnis zugänglichen »Zeit« besteht u. a. gerade darin, daß in ihr als einer puren, anfangs- und endlosen Jetzt-folge der ekstatische Charakter der ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit nivelliert ist. Diese Nivellierung selbst gründet aber ihrem existenzialen Sinne nach in einer bestimmten möglichen Zeitigung, gemäß der die Zeitlichkeit als uneigentliche die genannte »Zeit« zeitigt. Wenn daher die der Verständigkeit des Daseins zugängliche »Zeit« als nicht ursprünglich und vielmehr entspringend aus der eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit nachgewiesen wird, dann rechtfertigt sich gemäß dem Satze, a potiori fit denominatio, die Benennung der jetzt freigelegten Zeitlichkeit als ursprüngliche Zeit.
=============
A couple of issues:
1) Concerning "the time accessible to our ordinary understanding"...isn't this world time? It doesn't make sense that our ordinary conception of time is what is accessible to our ordinary conception/understanding. Rather, the conception is derivitive from something else which is accessible to it.
We may not agree on this point. Even so, from now on when I refer to ordinary time, unless specified otherwise, I mean either world time OR our ordinary conception of time since it isn't clear to me which one is being spoken about here.
2) Isn't the key characteristic of ordinary time "that in it (ordinary time), the ecstatical character of original time is leveled off? "As a beginning-less and endless now-series" seems to be qualifying the main point.
H. then says that on the condition that he shows ordinary time to be derivative, he is justified in calling the temporality he has exposed to us 'original time'. (This seems a bit tautological, doesn't it?)
3) The demonstration, then, involves showing that ordinary time is not its own foundation. While sequentiality is one of the characteristics of this kind of time, it is not this aspect that needs to be demonstrated. We simply want to see its derivational character.
On the other hand...
how would we ever get to know what the origin of ordinary time is? According to H., there is something we already know about it: Original time reveals something about itself in ordinary time; original time shows itself to be that which is covered over by ordinary time. (this is after all the main characteristic of ordinary time).
So, now what needs to be demonstrated is that ordinary time:
A) is grounded in something else
B) covers over its ground (since the only way to demonstrate A is to expose the ground and the only way the ground can be exposed is as something hidden by ordinary time.
Point B is precisely where the series of nows comes in to play since it is as this that ordinary time covers over its ground and thus that original time shows itself (and thus that we can see that ordinary time is derivative and not original time. And thus that we are justified in calling original time 'original time')
H's point seems a bit circular (surprise!). So the question is: Can this be demonstrated? If we delve deeper into the hermeneutic circle, will we find a richer "demonstration"? How does the series of nows "level off" original time? Is it simply because the latter is non-sequential that the sequentiality of ordinary time covers it over? Or is it for another reason? H. is not clear about this. Maybe this is self-explanatory, but in that case, I have other questions.
===============
"H. then says that on the condition that he shows ordinary time to be derivative, he is justified in calling the temporality he has exposed to us 'original time'. (This seems a bit tautological, doesn't it?)"--
It does, indeed, if one assumes that "the key characteristic of ordinary time is 'that in it (ordinary time), the ecstatical character of original time is leveled off'."
For, if this is the way H. defines "ordinary time" (and what else can "the key characteristic" be if not a defining one?), then he has no need to "show" (or, to use even more accurate translation of the verb nachweisen--to demonstrate) the derivative character of the ordinary time; such a character being presupposed in the very definition of the latter.
This is precisely why I strongly disagree with your reading of this phrase. I believe that H. here defines "ordinary time" as "a beginning-less and endless now-series".
I.e., the key characteristic of it is its being an endless and beginning-less sequence, every element of which is a now.
This is an immediately recognizable (epi-)phenomenon. I.e., H. begins with an "appearance". What remains to be demonstrated (or, proven) is that this is only an appearance; or, in other words, that this phenomenon is derivative.
Demonstrating this is precisely the task H. sets here for the rest of the book.
Only having fulfilled this task, H. will have the right to call "temporality", which he first introduced earlier in the same section (H. 326), "originary time." For, to have a right to call anything "originary" (ursprünglich), one has to show that something does originate (entspringt) from it.
At this point (=in section 65) H. does not yet have any grounds for claiming the existence (or Zeitigung, or whatever) of originary time. He thus could not possibly introduce here ordinary time as an originary one leveled off.
I infer from this that H. here says that in ordinary time "the ecstatical character of originary time is leveled off" only in anticipation of the point in his exposition at which the originary character of--i.e., the derivation of ordinary time (defined here as an infinite sequence of nows) from--temporality, will have been demonstrated.
"Blattner differs in that he (A) points out the thesis which he believes to be pivotal to Heidegger whole magnum opus, and (B) puts this thesis into question, actually claiming that Heidegger fails to demonstrate it."
So there seem to be a few questions that need to be addressed to get us back on track:
1) Is this something that requires demonstration?
2) If so, does H. ever attempt to explicitly demonstrate this? (Does Bl. mean by "failure to demonstrate" that H. never attempts to show this or that his demonstration fails?)
3) If H. has attempted to demonstrate this point, where does he do so? (What sections of SZ, etc.?)
4) If he does not, can the rest of his work serve as an implicit demonstration?
5) Does the demonstration (if it exists) really fail?
Also:
6) Is this thesis that important to H's project?
How does sequential time arrive out of non-sequential time?
===========
As a brief and preliminary response--here is what I believe to be a key passage (H. 329):
Das Charakteristische der dem vulgären Verständnis zugänglichen »Zeit« besteht u. a. gerade darin, daß in ihr als einer puren, anfangs- und endlosen Jetzt-folge der ekstatische Charakter der ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit nivelliert ist. Diese Nivellierung selbst gründet aber ihrem existenzialen Sinne nach in einer bestimmten möglichen Zeitigung, gemäß der die Zeitlichkeit als uneigentliche die genannte »Zeit« zeitigt. Wenn daher die der Verständigkeit des Daseins zugängliche »Zeit« als nicht ursprünglich und vielmehr entspringend aus der eigentlichen Zeitlichkeit nachgewiesen wird, dann rechtfertigt sich gemäß dem Satze, a potiori fit denominatio, die Benennung der jetzt freigelegten Zeitlichkeit als ursprüngliche Zeit.
=============
A couple of issues:
1) Concerning "the time accessible to our ordinary understanding"...isn't this world time? It doesn't make sense that our ordinary conception of time is what is accessible to our ordinary conception/understanding. Rather, the conception is derivitive from something else which is accessible to it.
We may not agree on this point. Even so, from now on when I refer to ordinary time, unless specified otherwise, I mean either world time OR our ordinary conception of time since it isn't clear to me which one is being spoken about here.
2) Isn't the key characteristic of ordinary time "that in it (ordinary time), the ecstatical character of original time is leveled off? "As a beginning-less and endless now-series" seems to be qualifying the main point.
H. then says that on the condition that he shows ordinary time to be derivative, he is justified in calling the temporality he has exposed to us 'original time'. (This seems a bit tautological, doesn't it?)
3) The demonstration, then, involves showing that ordinary time is not its own foundation. While sequentiality is one of the characteristics of this kind of time, it is not this aspect that needs to be demonstrated. We simply want to see its derivational character.
On the other hand...
how would we ever get to know what the origin of ordinary time is? According to H., there is something we already know about it: Original time reveals something about itself in ordinary time; original time shows itself to be that which is covered over by ordinary time. (this is after all the main characteristic of ordinary time).
So, now what needs to be demonstrated is that ordinary time:
A) is grounded in something else
B) covers over its ground (since the only way to demonstrate A is to expose the ground and the only way the ground can be exposed is as something hidden by ordinary time.
Point B is precisely where the series of nows comes in to play since it is as this that ordinary time covers over its ground and thus that original time shows itself (and thus that we can see that ordinary time is derivative and not original time. And thus that we are justified in calling original time 'original time')
H's point seems a bit circular (surprise!). So the question is: Can this be demonstrated? If we delve deeper into the hermeneutic circle, will we find a richer "demonstration"? How does the series of nows "level off" original time? Is it simply because the latter is non-sequential that the sequentiality of ordinary time covers it over? Or is it for another reason? H. is not clear about this. Maybe this is self-explanatory, but in that case, I have other questions.
===============
"H. then says that on the condition that he shows ordinary time to be derivative, he is justified in calling the temporality he has exposed to us 'original time'. (This seems a bit tautological, doesn't it?)"--
It does, indeed, if one assumes that "the key characteristic of ordinary time is 'that in it (ordinary time), the ecstatical character of original time is leveled off'."
For, if this is the way H. defines "ordinary time" (and what else can "the key characteristic" be if not a defining one?), then he has no need to "show" (or, to use even more accurate translation of the verb nachweisen--to demonstrate) the derivative character of the ordinary time; such a character being presupposed in the very definition of the latter.
This is precisely why I strongly disagree with your reading of this phrase. I believe that H. here defines "ordinary time" as "a beginning-less and endless now-series".
I.e., the key characteristic of it is its being an endless and beginning-less sequence, every element of which is a now.
This is an immediately recognizable (epi-)phenomenon. I.e., H. begins with an "appearance". What remains to be demonstrated (or, proven) is that this is only an appearance; or, in other words, that this phenomenon is derivative.
Demonstrating this is precisely the task H. sets here for the rest of the book.
Only having fulfilled this task, H. will have the right to call "temporality", which he first introduced earlier in the same section (H. 326), "originary time." For, to have a right to call anything "originary" (ursprünglich), one has to show that something does originate (entspringt) from it.
At this point (=in section 65) H. does not yet have any grounds for claiming the existence (or Zeitigung, or whatever) of originary time. He thus could not possibly introduce here ordinary time as an originary one leveled off.
I infer from this that H. here says that in ordinary time "the ecstatical character of originary time is leveled off" only in anticipation of the point in his exposition at which the originary character of--i.e., the derivation of ordinary time (defined here as an infinite sequence of nows) from--temporality, will have been demonstrated.
четверг, 16 июля 2009 г.
Heidegger's "temporal idealism"
(an exchange from a forum)
============
I am currently re-reading Blattner’s Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Among the books on SZ I am familiar with, I believe this to be the best. This is despite my disagreement with Blattner’s major point. In fact, the advantage that makes this book all but unique in Heidegger studies is that it has a point at all, whereas most others that I have across are either unquestioningly following Heidegger’s pronouncements, doing a kind of pious hermeneutics of his thought, as if he were a Church Father, or tracing the genesis of his idioms, as if he were a poet. At best, this or that particular point made by Heidegger is critically dealt with.
Blattner differs in that he (A) points out the thesis which he believes to be pivotal to Heidegger whole magnum opus, and (B) puts this thesis into question, actually claiming that Heidegger fails to demonstrate it.
So we have Blattner’s reconstruction of Heidegger’s thesis (let’s designate it THB), and Blattner’s own thesis (let’s designate it TB).
TB, in its turn, has two parts:
(a) Heidegger claims to have demonstrated THB, but (b) in fact he fails to do this.
Part (b) is the one with which I intuitively disagree. THB, on the other hand, seems to me prima facie correct.
Succintly put, it states that, for Heidegger, time in the mode we know it (“ordinary time”), which is sequential, originates form another mode of time (“originary time”), which is non-sequential.
This thesis, Blattner claims, is maintained by Heidegger not only in SZ but, also, in Basic Problems, and, to some extent, in earlier lecture courses.
Now, although, intuitively, THB seems to me correct (i.e., I believe Heidegger is, indeed, a "temporal idealist"), I am not sure that, agreeing with it, I invest the locutions “mode of...”, “sequential”, and “originates”, employed by Blattner, with the same respective meanings as he does.
To test TB (which is the purpose of my re-rereading Blattner’s book) I will thus have to answer the following questions:
(1) what does Heidegger mean by sequential “time”, and in what sense is it for him “sequential”?
(2) what is that on which the sequence of time for him depends, and in what sense that can also be possibly called “time”?
(3) what is precisely the character of this "dependence"?
Should there be a sufficient interest in this topic (demonstrated by a stimulating feedback ), I will be posting here my further reflections on it, as I proceed.
=========
I think you should post your thoughts regardless of the feedback. I'm certaintly interested but am not sure if you have a solid position on this issue or if you're still trying to clarify it. Please post any definite ideas you have about this so that we might respond more appropriately... we might otherwise misconstrue the meaning of your questions.
I am having a difficult time trying to describe sequential time without resorting to the typical Heideggerian terminology ('a series of nows', 'linear time', an experience of time as being 'present at hand' ) In the simplest language, sequential time seems to be a kind of reified time, in which each "moment" follows as a consequence of a prior one. But this seems TOO simple.
By your second question, are you asking what original time is?
Or are you asking why/how a sequence of moments originates from H's ideal "temporality" (always anticipating, always already being in etc???)? And where does 'world time' fit in? It's not quite sequential or original time but has more to do with an appropriate time to do something, right?
When you ask how that on which sequential time depends can be called time, are you implying that it is in some way inappropriate to call it time?
==============
I do not have any position so far, only some "fore-conceptions" and "fore-sights"
Blattner is extremely provocative: he claims that early H.'s whole project is a failure. One cannot be authentically a Heideggerian without taking a stand on this.
So, I am beginning to work through Bl.'s argument.
It may turn out, in the end, that he is actually right. I am open to this possibility.
So far I am not clear about how exactly Bl. construes sequential time in H. (but I am still only on p. 110 of 310 ).
My major question at this point is: the sequence of what is time thus understood? In other words: what are the elements of the "sequence"?
I see two possible answers to this question:
(1)
"nows" (="moments", or "spans" of time);
(2)
"dates" (="whens", not fruits ; in particular, those of the positions of the sun and/or the phases of the moon).
According to (1), time itself is a succession, a "flux". Such is, indeed, an "ordinary" (=popular) view. It is, of course, as absurd as it is naive, for a flux (and a change in general) is possible only in time.
Time itself cannot possibly be in time. It is thus not itself a succession.
Yet it still can be called "sequential" in the sense that is an immutable a priori form of any possible succession (in particular, that of "whens").
E.g., we say "today is July 13th", then "today is July 14th", both statements being true.
If sequentiality is taken in the sense (1), this means that one "substance" of today kind replaced another one of the same kind.
But if sequentiality is taken in the sense (2), the assumption is that "today" (=a spanned "now") is an unchanging form, or slot, one content of which, namely, "July 14th", replaced another one, namely "July 13th".
Does this distinction make sense?
(I will address your other questions later)
===============
I didn't even see that issue before!
Yes, the distinction is clear, I think.
But, if (2) is correct, and time is an unchanging form, even with variations of content, wouldn't "time" be an empty concept? In this case, the ordinary understanding of time is echoing that of Being (in the sense laid out by H at the opening of SZ).
I know we haven't gotten to Blattner's argument yet and that we're just laying the groundwork for it, but since sequential time is the ordinary conception of time, a lot more would need to be said to deem H's work "a failure".
That there is a conceptual error inherent in "a series of nows" or that the notion of time as an ideal form ("a series of whens") lacks any meaning only validates H's position since he claims that the conception of time ("sequential" time) is derivitive. There is almost an implicit assumption that such a conception must be flawed or, at the very least, incomplete.
But, I suppose it could raise problems in determing what non-sequential time is. Can you please explain in what sense H's idea of original time is "ideal"? It seems to me like there are at least a few ways to conceive idealism.
Also, not to detract from the main issue of your post, but have you ever read Stanley Rosen's The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger? (I'm not sure he always understands Heidegger's project, but it is also very interesting challenge to Heidegger). Also, The Irony of Heidegger, which I have never read (because it was too expensive and not yet in the library), is supposed to call Heidegger's work into question.
=============
Of course, for Kant (and H. in this period is, arguably, a Kantian) any concept as such (i.e. without intuitions) is, famously, "empty".
Time, however, is not a concept (let alone, an empirical one), but an a priori condition of the possibility of all (sensible) experience (in particular, that of change).
H., if my fore-sight is correct, goes further by raising (and answering) the question about the being of this possibility. He shows, how exactly this "empty form" of time exists.
As both I and Bl. see it, for H. the "understanding" (or, more accurately, "interpretation") of time as sequential is not so much "flawed" as it is derivative.
(Of course, H. does famously say that in ontology every derivation implies degeneration.... )
It is precisely the derivation of time's sequentiality that, Bl. claims, H. fails to demonstrate.
But, if sequentiality, being an essential feature of "ordinary" time, cannot be shown to derive from Dasein's existence, then one have no grounds to claim, as H. does, that all modes of times (including the "world time", which, on Bl.'s reading of SZ, is also sequential, just as the universal, or ordinary, time is) depend on Dasein (which claim constitutes the "temporal idealism" championed, on Bl.'s reading, by H.).
Rosen's book you mentioned has been sitting on my desk for quite a while, but I have not been able to make myself to read it. My impression is that it is more about Rosen than about Heidegger.
I.e., Rosen seems to be criticizing H., on his, rather than on H.'s, own grounds. This is what makes it much less interesting to me.
==============
OK. I think I get it. When you first posted this, I was especially interested in what you meant by your second and third questions:
(2) what is that on which the sequence of time for him depends...
(3) what is precisely the character of this "dependence"?
Now, I think I see what you were getting at. Why sequentiality and not something else? How exactly is sequentiality grounded in original time, and what does it say about original time?
I like what you said about time- that it is the a priori condition for the possibility of change. But, I thought this pertained only to original time, not sequential time. I was under the impression that a key difference between sequential time and original time was that time becomes conceptualized (and thus always misconceptualized) in the former.
Please post further updates on Blattner's position.
Rosen is a little self-absorbed, I think, but I find his grandiosity extremely entertaining He has a caustic writing style, often misunderstands H's intentions and seems to me to be a cranky, disgruntled man. But, every once in a while, he says something very thought provoking...
=============
Interestingly, as I went on reading, I have almost immediately come across Bl.'s dealing with an objection to his thesis implied precisely by my distinction between sequentiality (1) and (2).
The thesis, I will repeat, is that the "originary time" is not sequential in the sense the "ordinary time" is, namely, in the sense that "the future succeeds the present, which in turn succeeds the past" (p. 92) .
The objection is that the three dimensions of the "originary time" (or, rather, "temporality") are, for H. , the "extases" directed towards things, respectively, future, present, and past. And when H. states (SZ, H. 350) that "temporalizing does not mean a 'succession'", he specifies right away that it is the succession of the extases that he has in mind. However, the sequentiality even of the "ordinary time" does not imply that, say, one's anticipation of things future "succeeds" somehow one's encountering of things present. Thus, the sequentiality H. denies to the originary temporality is not that which one would normally ascribe to the "ordinary time".
Bl.'s response to this is that the respective "schemata", towards which the extases are directed, also do not succeed each other (even though H. does not mention this explicitly).
E.g., as I am swimming towards a buoy, whereas my "looking forward" to reaching it is invariably there until I actually reach it, my present distance from it constantly gets succeeded by a future shorter one.
This "looking forward" towards reaching the buoy, however, is not what H. means by the originary futural extasis. The horizontal schema of the latter, defined as its "toward-which", is, for H., "for-the-sake-of-itself" (SZ, H. 365), where "itself" means a certain possibility (whether authentic of not) of Dasein's being.
Say, I am swimming now, towards that buoy, for the sake of being a swimmer (whether in das Man's eyes or in my own unique sense). My directedness here and now towards the goal of reaching the buoy is motivated by (and thus depends upon) my directedness to the "goal" of being a swimmer.
Unlike the buoy towards which I am swimming, however, the goal of being a swimmer can never possibly be finally reached. To be a swimmer, I am to swim again and again. The possibility of being a swimmer thus, unlike the possibility of reaching the buoy I am swimming towards, cannot possibly be actualized. I.e., it is not exhausted, as a possibility, by any actualization of it.
It is thus a kind of "thing" future that cannot, in principle, "succeed" that which I am presently doing in order to reach it, namely, swimming to that buoy.
============
I am currently re-reading Blattner’s Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Among the books on SZ I am familiar with, I believe this to be the best. This is despite my disagreement with Blattner’s major point. In fact, the advantage that makes this book all but unique in Heidegger studies is that it has a point at all, whereas most others that I have across are either unquestioningly following Heidegger’s pronouncements, doing a kind of pious hermeneutics of his thought, as if he were a Church Father, or tracing the genesis of his idioms, as if he were a poet. At best, this or that particular point made by Heidegger is critically dealt with.
Blattner differs in that he (A) points out the thesis which he believes to be pivotal to Heidegger whole magnum opus, and (B) puts this thesis into question, actually claiming that Heidegger fails to demonstrate it.
So we have Blattner’s reconstruction of Heidegger’s thesis (let’s designate it THB), and Blattner’s own thesis (let’s designate it TB).
TB, in its turn, has two parts:
(a) Heidegger claims to have demonstrated THB, but (b) in fact he fails to do this.
Part (b) is the one with which I intuitively disagree. THB, on the other hand, seems to me prima facie correct.
Succintly put, it states that, for Heidegger, time in the mode we know it (“ordinary time”), which is sequential, originates form another mode of time (“originary time”), which is non-sequential.
This thesis, Blattner claims, is maintained by Heidegger not only in SZ but, also, in Basic Problems, and, to some extent, in earlier lecture courses.
Now, although, intuitively, THB seems to me correct (i.e., I believe Heidegger is, indeed, a "temporal idealist"), I am not sure that, agreeing with it, I invest the locutions “mode of...”, “sequential”, and “originates”, employed by Blattner, with the same respective meanings as he does.
To test TB (which is the purpose of my re-rereading Blattner’s book) I will thus have to answer the following questions:
(1) what does Heidegger mean by sequential “time”, and in what sense is it for him “sequential”?
(2) what is that on which the sequence of time for him depends, and in what sense that can also be possibly called “time”?
(3) what is precisely the character of this "dependence"?
Should there be a sufficient interest in this topic (demonstrated by a stimulating feedback ), I will be posting here my further reflections on it, as I proceed.
=========
I think you should post your thoughts regardless of the feedback. I'm certaintly interested but am not sure if you have a solid position on this issue or if you're still trying to clarify it. Please post any definite ideas you have about this so that we might respond more appropriately... we might otherwise misconstrue the meaning of your questions.
I am having a difficult time trying to describe sequential time without resorting to the typical Heideggerian terminology ('a series of nows', 'linear time', an experience of time as being 'present at hand' ) In the simplest language, sequential time seems to be a kind of reified time, in which each "moment" follows as a consequence of a prior one. But this seems TOO simple.
By your second question, are you asking what original time is?
Or are you asking why/how a sequence of moments originates from H's ideal "temporality" (always anticipating, always already being in etc???)? And where does 'world time' fit in? It's not quite sequential or original time but has more to do with an appropriate time to do something, right?
When you ask how that on which sequential time depends can be called time, are you implying that it is in some way inappropriate to call it time?
==============
I do not have any position so far, only some "fore-conceptions" and "fore-sights"
Blattner is extremely provocative: he claims that early H.'s whole project is a failure. One cannot be authentically a Heideggerian without taking a stand on this.
So, I am beginning to work through Bl.'s argument.
It may turn out, in the end, that he is actually right. I am open to this possibility.
So far I am not clear about how exactly Bl. construes sequential time in H. (but I am still only on p. 110 of 310 ).
My major question at this point is: the sequence of what is time thus understood? In other words: what are the elements of the "sequence"?
I see two possible answers to this question:
(1)
"nows" (="moments", or "spans" of time);
(2)
"dates" (="whens", not fruits ; in particular, those of the positions of the sun and/or the phases of the moon).
According to (1), time itself is a succession, a "flux". Such is, indeed, an "ordinary" (=popular) view. It is, of course, as absurd as it is naive, for a flux (and a change in general) is possible only in time.
Time itself cannot possibly be in time. It is thus not itself a succession.
Yet it still can be called "sequential" in the sense that is an immutable a priori form of any possible succession (in particular, that of "whens").
E.g., we say "today is July 13th", then "today is July 14th", both statements being true.
If sequentiality is taken in the sense (1), this means that one "substance" of today kind replaced another one of the same kind.
But if sequentiality is taken in the sense (2), the assumption is that "today" (=a spanned "now") is an unchanging form, or slot, one content of which, namely, "July 14th", replaced another one, namely "July 13th".
Does this distinction make sense?
(I will address your other questions later)
===============
I didn't even see that issue before!
Yes, the distinction is clear, I think.
But, if (2) is correct, and time is an unchanging form, even with variations of content, wouldn't "time" be an empty concept? In this case, the ordinary understanding of time is echoing that of Being (in the sense laid out by H at the opening of SZ).
I know we haven't gotten to Blattner's argument yet and that we're just laying the groundwork for it, but since sequential time is the ordinary conception of time, a lot more would need to be said to deem H's work "a failure".
That there is a conceptual error inherent in "a series of nows" or that the notion of time as an ideal form ("a series of whens") lacks any meaning only validates H's position since he claims that the conception of time ("sequential" time) is derivitive. There is almost an implicit assumption that such a conception must be flawed or, at the very least, incomplete.
But, I suppose it could raise problems in determing what non-sequential time is. Can you please explain in what sense H's idea of original time is "ideal"? It seems to me like there are at least a few ways to conceive idealism.
Also, not to detract from the main issue of your post, but have you ever read Stanley Rosen's The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger? (I'm not sure he always understands Heidegger's project, but it is also very interesting challenge to Heidegger). Also, The Irony of Heidegger, which I have never read (because it was too expensive and not yet in the library), is supposed to call Heidegger's work into question.
=============
Of course, for Kant (and H. in this period is, arguably, a Kantian) any concept as such (i.e. without intuitions) is, famously, "empty".
Time, however, is not a concept (let alone, an empirical one), but an a priori condition of the possibility of all (sensible) experience (in particular, that of change).
H., if my fore-sight is correct, goes further by raising (and answering) the question about the being of this possibility. He shows, how exactly this "empty form" of time exists.
As both I and Bl. see it, for H. the "understanding" (or, more accurately, "interpretation") of time as sequential is not so much "flawed" as it is derivative.
(Of course, H. does famously say that in ontology every derivation implies degeneration.... )
It is precisely the derivation of time's sequentiality that, Bl. claims, H. fails to demonstrate.
But, if sequentiality, being an essential feature of "ordinary" time, cannot be shown to derive from Dasein's existence, then one have no grounds to claim, as H. does, that all modes of times (including the "world time", which, on Bl.'s reading of SZ, is also sequential, just as the universal, or ordinary, time is) depend on Dasein (which claim constitutes the "temporal idealism" championed, on Bl.'s reading, by H.).
Rosen's book you mentioned has been sitting on my desk for quite a while, but I have not been able to make myself to read it. My impression is that it is more about Rosen than about Heidegger.
I.e., Rosen seems to be criticizing H., on his, rather than on H.'s, own grounds. This is what makes it much less interesting to me.
==============
OK. I think I get it. When you first posted this, I was especially interested in what you meant by your second and third questions:
(2) what is that on which the sequence of time for him depends...
(3) what is precisely the character of this "dependence"?
Now, I think I see what you were getting at. Why sequentiality and not something else? How exactly is sequentiality grounded in original time, and what does it say about original time?
I like what you said about time- that it is the a priori condition for the possibility of change. But, I thought this pertained only to original time, not sequential time. I was under the impression that a key difference between sequential time and original time was that time becomes conceptualized (and thus always misconceptualized) in the former.
Please post further updates on Blattner's position.
Rosen is a little self-absorbed, I think, but I find his grandiosity extremely entertaining He has a caustic writing style, often misunderstands H's intentions and seems to me to be a cranky, disgruntled man. But, every once in a while, he says something very thought provoking...
=============
Interestingly, as I went on reading, I have almost immediately come across Bl.'s dealing with an objection to his thesis implied precisely by my distinction between sequentiality (1) and (2).
The thesis, I will repeat, is that the "originary time" is not sequential in the sense the "ordinary time" is, namely, in the sense that "the future succeeds the present, which in turn succeeds the past" (p. 92) .
The objection is that the three dimensions of the "originary time" (or, rather, "temporality") are, for H. , the "extases" directed towards things, respectively, future, present, and past. And when H. states (SZ, H. 350) that "temporalizing does not mean a 'succession'", he specifies right away that it is the succession of the extases that he has in mind. However, the sequentiality even of the "ordinary time" does not imply that, say, one's anticipation of things future "succeeds" somehow one's encountering of things present. Thus, the sequentiality H. denies to the originary temporality is not that which one would normally ascribe to the "ordinary time".
Bl.'s response to this is that the respective "schemata", towards which the extases are directed, also do not succeed each other (even though H. does not mention this explicitly).
E.g., as I am swimming towards a buoy, whereas my "looking forward" to reaching it is invariably there until I actually reach it, my present distance from it constantly gets succeeded by a future shorter one.
This "looking forward" towards reaching the buoy, however, is not what H. means by the originary futural extasis. The horizontal schema of the latter, defined as its "toward-which", is, for H., "for-the-sake-of-itself" (SZ, H. 365), where "itself" means a certain possibility (whether authentic of not) of Dasein's being.
Say, I am swimming now, towards that buoy, for the sake of being a swimmer (whether in das Man's eyes or in my own unique sense). My directedness here and now towards the goal of reaching the buoy is motivated by (and thus depends upon) my directedness to the "goal" of being a swimmer.
Unlike the buoy towards which I am swimming, however, the goal of being a swimmer can never possibly be finally reached. To be a swimmer, I am to swim again and again. The possibility of being a swimmer thus, unlike the possibility of reaching the buoy I am swimming towards, cannot possibly be actualized. I.e., it is not exhausted, as a possibility, by any actualization of it.
It is thus a kind of "thing" future that cannot, in principle, "succeed" that which I am presently doing in order to reach it, namely, swimming to that buoy.
пятница, 19 июня 2009 г.
подлинность и апофатика
Двадцать первое. Ночь. Понедельник.
Очертанья столицы во мгле.
Сочинил же какой-то бездельник,
Что бывает любовь на земле.
И от лености или со скуки
Все поверили, так и живут:
Ждут свиданий, боятся разлуки
И любовные песни поют.
Но иным открывается тайна,
И почиет на них тишина...
Я на это наткнулась случайно
И с тех пор все как будто больна.
1917
первые два четверостишия отражают существование в модусе "das Man"-а; его любовный дискурс скорее заслоняет, чем открывает возможность подлинной любви.
открывается же она "иным", инокам.
на языке "das Man"-а это откровение невыразимо.
"наткнувшийся" на него сталкивается с "тайной", которую никому не может передать.
Присутствие дает себе в призыве понять самую свою ему способность быть. Потому, этот зов есть молчание. Речь совести никогда не приходит к озвучанию. Совесть зовет только молча, т.е. зов идет из беззвучия одинокого не-по-себе и зовет вызванное присутствие как имеющее стать тихим назад в тишину (die Stille) самого себя.
SZ, S. 296; пер. Бибихина
Очертанья столицы во мгле.
Сочинил же какой-то бездельник,
Что бывает любовь на земле.
И от лености или со скуки
Все поверили, так и живут:
Ждут свиданий, боятся разлуки
И любовные песни поют.
Но иным открывается тайна,
И почиет на них тишина...
Я на это наткнулась случайно
И с тех пор все как будто больна.
1917
первые два четверостишия отражают существование в модусе "das Man"-а; его любовный дискурс скорее заслоняет, чем открывает возможность подлинной любви.
открывается же она "иным", инокам.
на языке "das Man"-а это откровение невыразимо.
"наткнувшийся" на него сталкивается с "тайной", которую никому не может передать.
Присутствие дает себе в призыве понять самую свою ему способность быть. Потому, этот зов есть молчание. Речь совести никогда не приходит к озвучанию. Совесть зовет только молча, т.е. зов идет из беззвучия одинокого не-по-себе и зовет вызванное присутствие как имеющее стать тихим назад в тишину (die Stille) самого себя.
SZ, S. 296; пер. Бибихина
давно искал смысл этих строк:
Паденье - неизменный спутник страха,
И самый страх есть чувство пустоты.
...
1912
ключ:
Хайдеггер хочет заставить обернуться пришедшую в движение жизнь; она должна "осознать себя в своих корнях", что значит: она должна обнаружить ту почву, из которой произрастает и от которой стремится убежать, потому что уже освоилась (festlebt) в новом, своем мире. Но не потому ли этот поворот дается так тяжело, что жизнь предчувствует: там, в своем средоточии, она не найдет ничего, кроме пустоты, horror vacui , который и гонит ее на поиски того, чем можно было бы заполнить этот вакуум? Не должны ли мы, ради сохранения своей жизнестойкости, скрывать от самих себя, что именно гонит нас в мир, в котором мы всегда имеем нечто, о чем нам нужно заботиться? Хайдеггер подстрекает нас бросить взгляд на то, что мы в своей повседневности воспринимаем всерьез, -- после такого взгляда тот, кто прежде был всерьез озабочен, уже не сможет оставаться серьезным на старый манер. Волшебное слово, с помощью которого Хайдеггер заставляет нас внезапно увидеть Повседневное и Обычное в совершенно ином свете, звучит так: забота. "Жизнь есть озабоченность, причем именно такая, которая выражается в склонности к деланию легким для себя, к бегству" (GA 61,109).
Понятие "забота" будет стоять в центре "Бытия и времени", но уже в этих лекциях [1921/22 гг.] ему посвящен производящий сильное впечатление фрагмент. "Забота" --это обобщающее обозначение для таких установок, как: "для человека важно то-то", человек "беспокоится о чем-то", "озабочен чем-то", "намеревается что-то предпринять", "следит за порядком", "возится с чем-то", "желает получить какой-то результат".
...
Для обозначения этого процесса, заключающегося в том, что жизнь "живет из самой себя" и осваивается с тем, о чем она заботится, и при этом "отдаляется от самой себя", Хайдеггер и придумал термин "обрушивание" (Ruinanz). Он сознательно стремился вызвать ассоциации со словами "руины", "разрушение". В более узком смысле термин "обрушивание" означает падение. До этого момента Хайдеггер истолковывал "заботу" и "озабоченность" как движение в будущее или в прошлое, но в любом случае как "горизонтальное" движение. Теперь он опрокидывает горизонталь, превращая ее в вертикаль, и тем самым, естественно, придает движению стремительное ускорение: движение превращается в падение, в низвержение. Однако "фактичная жизнь", живя из самой себя, даже не замечает, что она падает.
И самый страх есть чувство пустоты.
...
1912
ключ:
Хайдеггер хочет заставить обернуться пришедшую в движение жизнь; она должна "осознать себя в своих корнях", что значит: она должна обнаружить ту почву, из которой произрастает и от которой стремится убежать, потому что уже освоилась (festlebt) в новом, своем мире. Но не потому ли этот поворот дается так тяжело, что жизнь предчувствует: там, в своем средоточии, она не найдет ничего, кроме пустоты, horror vacui , который и гонит ее на поиски того, чем можно было бы заполнить этот вакуум? Не должны ли мы, ради сохранения своей жизнестойкости, скрывать от самих себя, что именно гонит нас в мир, в котором мы всегда имеем нечто, о чем нам нужно заботиться? Хайдеггер подстрекает нас бросить взгляд на то, что мы в своей повседневности воспринимаем всерьез, -- после такого взгляда тот, кто прежде был всерьез озабочен, уже не сможет оставаться серьезным на старый манер. Волшебное слово, с помощью которого Хайдеггер заставляет нас внезапно увидеть Повседневное и Обычное в совершенно ином свете, звучит так: забота. "Жизнь есть озабоченность, причем именно такая, которая выражается в склонности к деланию легким для себя, к бегству" (GA 61,109).
Понятие "забота" будет стоять в центре "Бытия и времени", но уже в этих лекциях [1921/22 гг.] ему посвящен производящий сильное впечатление фрагмент. "Забота" --это обобщающее обозначение для таких установок, как: "для человека важно то-то", человек "беспокоится о чем-то", "озабочен чем-то", "намеревается что-то предпринять", "следит за порядком", "возится с чем-то", "желает получить какой-то результат".
...
Для обозначения этого процесса, заключающегося в том, что жизнь "живет из самой себя" и осваивается с тем, о чем она заботится, и при этом "отдаляется от самой себя", Хайдеггер и придумал термин "обрушивание" (Ruinanz). Он сознательно стремился вызвать ассоциации со словами "руины", "разрушение". В более узком смысле термин "обрушивание" означает падение. До этого момента Хайдеггер истолковывал "заботу" и "озабоченность" как движение в будущее или в прошлое, но в любом случае как "горизонтальное" движение. Теперь он опрокидывает горизонталь, превращая ее в вертикаль, и тем самым, естественно, придает движению стремительное ускорение: движение превращается в падение, в низвержение. Однако "фактичная жизнь", живя из самой себя, даже не замечает, что она падает.
откуда берется время:
Ожидающе-удерживающе-актуализирующее озабочение "отпускает себе" (»»laesst sich««) так или иначе время и озабочиваясь его себе датирует, даже без всякого и до всякого специфически исчисляющего определения времени.
SZ, S. 409; перевод Бибихина, с изменением.
дискуссия здесь.
SZ, S. 409; перевод Бибихина, с изменением.
дискуссия здесь.
вторник, 12 мая 2009 г.
"вестИ жизнь"
животное живёт.
только человек таки или иначе свою жизнь проводит.
в этом обороте речи неявно выражено понимание существенной черты специфически-человеческого бытия:
жить--значит так или иначе себя вести, следовательно: быть впереди себя.
вот первичная (до-рефлективная) форма само-отношения.
только человек таки или иначе свою жизнь проводит.
в этом обороте речи неявно выражено понимание существенной черты специфически-человеческого бытия:
жить--значит так или иначе себя вести, следовательно: быть впереди себя.
вот первичная (до-рефлективная) форма само-отношения.
пятница, 20 февраля 2009 г.
1.3
но что нам дался этот вопрос о бытии? потому ли только, что нам хочется вести диалог с Платоном, который его поставил? мыслить в традиции, основанной Парменидом?
или потому, что для нас самих важно что-то из того, что было важно для Парменида и Платона?
если так, что именно?
мышление—восхождение от многообразия к единству.
нам дано многообразие существующего, хотя и сгруппированного «естественным» образом в разобщенные между собою общности—«регионы» бытия.
говоря обо всех элементах этих регионов как о «существующих», мы свидетельствуем о своем до-теоретическом понимании их единства.
смысл "бытия", соответствующий этим регионам, может--и должен--становиться предметом философского раскрытия, без которого "позитивные" науки, при всех своих впечатляющих достижениях в этих регионах, неизбежны слепы.
КЧР являет пример раскрытия онтологии региона "природа".
но и сами региональные онтологии обречены на наивность, пока не прояснен смысл "бытия вообще".
это задача фундаментальной онтологии.
или потому, что для нас самих важно что-то из того, что было важно для Парменида и Платона?
если так, что именно?
мышление—восхождение от многообразия к единству.
нам дано многообразие существующего, хотя и сгруппированного «естественным» образом в разобщенные между собою общности—«регионы» бытия.
говоря обо всех элементах этих регионов как о «существующих», мы свидетельствуем о своем до-теоретическом понимании их единства.
смысл "бытия", соответствующий этим регионам, может--и должен--становиться предметом философского раскрытия, без которого "позитивные" науки, при всех своих впечатляющих достижениях в этих регионах, неизбежны слепы.
КЧР являет пример раскрытия онтологии региона "природа".
но и сами региональные онтологии обречены на наивность, пока не прояснен смысл "бытия вообще".
это задача фундаментальной онтологии.
вторник, 17 февраля 2009 г.
1.2
в _Софисте_ вопрос поставлен так: что собственно, мы подразумеваем, когда говорим о чем-то как о «существующим»?
исходной данностью является то, что мы-таки подразумеваем нечто. т.е.—уже, до какого-либо теоретизирования, понимаем, что «делает» существующее—существующим.
поскольку это понимание у нас есть, оно и само может рассматриваться как существующее.
Х. называет его Dasein.
но в каком смысле Dasein «существует»? что делает его существующим?
философское вопрошание о бытии неизбежно движется в круге.
попадание в этот круг знаменует разрыв философии с мифом, т.е.—с «рассказыванием басен» о бытии как о некоем, единственном в своем роде, «сущем».
даже Парменид (не говоря уже о Фалесе и др.) говорит о бытии именно так.
т.е.—не различает бытие и сущее.
но без этого различения невозможно поставить вопрос о бытии.
т.к. его тогда просто некому задать. узнать что-либо о бытии можно только у существующего.
с какого же именно существующего начать опрос?
Х. предлагает: с Dasein.
.
исходной данностью является то, что мы-таки подразумеваем нечто. т.е.—уже, до какого-либо теоретизирования, понимаем, что «делает» существующее—существующим.
поскольку это понимание у нас есть, оно и само может рассматриваться как существующее.
Х. называет его Dasein.
но в каком смысле Dasein «существует»? что делает его существующим?
философское вопрошание о бытии неизбежно движется в круге.
попадание в этот круг знаменует разрыв философии с мифом, т.е.—с «рассказыванием басен» о бытии как о некоем, единственном в своем роде, «сущем».
даже Парменид (не говоря уже о Фалесе и др.) говорит о бытии именно так.
т.е.—не различает бытие и сущее.
но без этого различения невозможно поставить вопрос о бытии.
т.к. его тогда просто некому задать. узнать что-либо о бытии можно только у существующего.
с какого же именно существующего начать опрос?
Х. предлагает: с Dasein.
.
воскресенье, 15 февраля 2009 г.
1.1
пробудить смысл вопроса—значит явным образом (ausdruecklich) вопрос повторить.
в _Софисте_ контекстом вопроса была «борьба гигантов», истолковывавших сущее как, соответственно, тело или вид.
в первом случае быть—значит противо-стоять (оказывать сопротивление); во втором—пред-стоять (являть, казать себя). парадигма доступа к сущему, соответственно—осязание или зрение.
именно в такой ситуации Платон предлагает своё решение (так, по крайней мере это трактует Х. в своём курсе по _Софисту_).
наша ситуация иная. смысл бытия давно уже не является предметом спора, спорность его забыта.
бытие представляется наиболее общим—и, соответственно, наименее содержательным—понятием.
сказать о чем-либо, что оно—сущее (т.е. существует), значит не сказать о нем, по сути, ничего. «чистое бытие=чистое ничто» (с) Гегель.
соответственно, смысл его неопределим.
но он и не требует определения, ибо и так—сам собой—понятен (selbstverstaendlich).
однако лишь то, что само собой понятно, т.е. настолько знакомо, что не вызывает никаких вопросов, может--и должно--стать темой вопрошания в философии.
повторить вопрос--значит его заново поставить.
в _Софисте_ контекстом вопроса была «борьба гигантов», истолковывавших сущее как, соответственно, тело или вид.
в первом случае быть—значит противо-стоять (оказывать сопротивление); во втором—пред-стоять (являть, казать себя). парадигма доступа к сущему, соответственно—осязание или зрение.
именно в такой ситуации Платон предлагает своё решение (так, по крайней мере это трактует Х. в своём курсе по _Софисту_).
наша ситуация иная. смысл бытия давно уже не является предметом спора, спорность его забыта.
бытие представляется наиболее общим—и, соответственно, наименее содержательным—понятием.
сказать о чем-либо, что оно—сущее (т.е. существует), значит не сказать о нем, по сути, ничего. «чистое бытие=чистое ничто» (с) Гегель.
соответственно, смысл его неопределим.
но он и не требует определения, ибо и так—сам собой—понятен (selbstverstaendlich).
однако лишь то, что само собой понятно, т.е. настолько знакомо, что не вызывает никаких вопросов, может--и должно--стать темой вопрошания в философии.
повторить вопрос--значит его заново поставить.
эпиграф
в цитате из _Софиста_ речь идет о смысле некоего слова, выражения (Ausdruck).
а именно—слова «существующее» (ον, seiend; причастие без артикля).
вопрос, тем не менее, формулируется двояко: о «смысле “бытия”» и «смысле бытия».
непонятно не только, что значит слово "бытие", но и как возможно понимание бытия (Seinverstaendnis).
непонятно даже, что именно требует здесь понимания.
первым делом, поэтому, требуется пробудить смысл этого вопроса.
а именно—слова «существующее» (ον, seiend; причастие без артикля).
вопрос, тем не менее, формулируется двояко: о «смысле “бытия”» и «смысле бытия».
непонятно не только, что значит слово "бытие", но и как возможно понимание бытия (Seinverstaendnis).
непонятно даже, что именно требует здесь понимания.
первым делом, поэтому, требуется пробудить смысл этого вопроса.
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